



NCA

National Crime Agency

Mapping Out Cyber Crime Infrastructure A Law Enforcement Approach

Jon Flaherty

UK National Cyber Crime Unit

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Cyber Crime Infrastructure

“A Disposal Front End With A Static Stable Back End”

- Compromised and malicious domains hosting exploits
- Local log file tracing network intrusions / drops
- Leads to a common static and more stable IP infrastructure
- RIPE NCC members caught up in the middle of it ?

A New Approach

“Targeting the Infra not the Incident”

- **How does LE begin to map it ?**
- **Can we disrupt it ?**
- **Need for collaboration with RIPE community and service providers**

TEST CASE

AIM

Attribute a suspect ISP and reseller infrastructure to “Bullet Proof Hosting” activity

OBJECTIVES

Design an ISP mapping strategy that visualises target infrastructure to enhance attribution and operational strategy

Mapping Strategy

A 4 Stage Methodology

- Stage 1 : Collation of intelligence
- Stage 2 : IPv4 Network WHOIS research
- Stage 3 : Mapping IPv4 to DNS enrichment
- Stage 4 : Visualisation

Stage 1 - Collation of Intelligence

What do we know so far ?

- Hosting provider and suspects located in one country
- Operating under alias names
- Single strand IPv4 intelligence linked to lots of cyber crime

Stage 2 – IPv4 Network WHOIS Research

Mapping single strand intelligence across the WHOIS

- Find ISP & Reseller full IPv4 address ranges
- Dates of IP assignment
- Identify ASN / upstream providers who announce IP routes



Stage 2

Now what do we know ?

- Additional Hosting / Reseller IPv4 space
- Consistent hosting providers of reseller space
- Multiple RIPE NCC members announce target IP traffic
- Static IP infrastructure, small, consistent /27 IP address ranges
- RIPE WHOIS reveals more provider alias names and handles
- Small ARIN infrastructure

Stage 3 – Mapping IPv4 space to DNS Enrichment

What domain traffic and types of service point to these ranges ?

- Web, Mail, Name, VPN Servers
- Number of sites hosted
- Historic domains
- Bad Traffic
- Data Enrichment – Abuse feeds



MALTEGO



Stage 3

Now what do we know ?

- Target ISP ranges show legitimate web traffic
- UK reseller ranges carry known malicious traffic
- UK hosted GOZ and DGA activity across .eu ccTLD's
 - **.991ce.34691a9.832.1c.1736.ced.87.4050.xxxxxx.xxxxx.eu**
- GOZ privacy protected domains with a common registrar
- VPN end point servers and VPN over DNS traffic
 - **In-037.rd-00004080.id-4934215.v0.tun.vpnoverdns.com**
- Beginning to see the bad from the good....

Stage 4 – Visualisation

Charting the infrastructure

- Bulk domain WHOIS lookups
- Geo locating IP ranges and records
- Colour coded clusters
- Layering ownership
- Pattern matching



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BPH Picture

Clean Front v Malicious Reseller End Ranges

- Diversified infra of PVS hosted content and VPN end points
- Reseller architecture across more than one member / country
- Small IP blocks / multiple RIPE Database handles
- An attraction to cheap virtual hosting / IXP
- ASN commonalities / sponsoring org's for IP ranges
- Use of RIPE NCC tools gives LE more routes to best evidence.....

Can We Disrupt The Abuse ?

Need For Collaboration - Mitigation@Scale

- Mapping infrastructure identifies abuse at greater scale
- LE migrating into proactive CERT prevention / outreach to Industry
- IP reseller intelligence mapped and shared to members
- PDNS entries notified as an ISP abuse issue / feed to Industry
- Malicious IP ranges become Spamhaus blacklist entries
- Privacy/Proxy abuse becomes an ICANN compliance submission

Questions



jonathan.flaherty@nca.x.gsi.gov.uk