





# The Role of Analytics in Routing, Network Performance and SDN

Cengiz Alaettinoglu


# It all started with a jitter study (2000)



- Studied jitter on 3 US and 1 European backbones for several weeks
- For 99.99% packets, measured jitter < 1ms




# However, 0.01% of Jitter was severe



7 seconds jitter

10+ seconds packet drops




Severe packet reordering


# Theory: Packets being spewed out from an unwinding routing loop...



- Did we really have long routing loops in the network?
- Did ISIS really take 10+ seconds to converge?
- So, we ***analyzed routing*** along with jitter




# ISIS in a Nutshell




- Each router sends Link State Packets (LSP) that describes its local topology
  - List of links to neighbors (adjacencies), prefixes along with metrics
  - This is refreshed periodically, otherwise LSP content is purged
- This is flooded across the network
  - Each router sends new LSPs it receives to its neighbors
  - Neighbors send to their neighbors, ...
- Each router accumulates LSPs into a database (LSDB) and constructs the current view of the topology
- Shortest paths are computed using Dijkstra's SPF algorithm

# Excessive ISIS churn caused excessive LSP Propagation Delay



All link state packets (LSPs) including refreshes


LSPs that report a change



LSP propagation delay

- Seconds between seeing the same LSP in the east and the west coasts of the US

# Explanation



- Link state databases were not in sync:
  - Very large LSP databases
  - High churn rate caused many LSPs to flood
  - LSP rate-control slowed down flooding
  - Any topology change could result in a loop under these conditions
- We realized being able to look at routing was key for powerful network performance analysis
- Today, we see very high churn in very large TE databases using auto-bandwidth with large number of tunnels

# Route Analytics Today



## Presentation

Reporting

Alerting

Planning

...

Trouble-  
shooting

## Analysis

Path  
Reports

RCA

Exit  
Routers

...

Traffic  
Reports

## Collection

BGP

IGPs

Flows

Tunnels


...

Multicast

- Troubleshooting and visualization
- Service/application monitoring and alerting
- Network health assessment
- Topology-aware traffic analysis
- Proactive change modeling
- Analytics-driven Software Defined Networking applications



# Use Case: Diagnosing Black Holing




- ❑ A peering router to a major service provider crashed
  - Hot swappable card was not quite so...
- ❑ Traffic to the SP was black-holed network-wide
  - Traffic exiting all 6 locations was black-holed
- ❑ About 3 minutes of routing outage
  - 3 minutes was too short to diagnose the issue at human speed
  - Had a 45 minute impact on the services and ad revenues
    - Users who could not use the service did something else

# Expected Exit-Points Before Incident




- 6 Exit-Points (circled)
- Blue routers take the blue exit router...




# Recursive Route Resolution




- BGP determines exits
  - NextHop attribute
- Usually IGP distance determines the closest
- More accurately, we recursively find a path to NextHop
  - IGP, static, BGP, or a series...



# The Incident



## □ ISIS activity during incident




Time	Router	Operation	Operand	Attributes
2004-10-28 07:36:11.974206	core-ord-01	Drop Neighbor	edge-ord-02	Metric: Down (TE)
2004-10-28 07:36:12.374093	core-ord-02	Drop Neighbor	edge-ord-02	Metric: Down (TE)
2004-10-28 07:38:09.063564	core-ord-01	Add Neighbor	edge-ord-02	Metric: 503 (TE)
2004-10-28 07:38:36.071999	core-ord-02	Add Neighbor	edge-ord-02	Metric: 503 (TE)

# Exit-Points During Incident





## □ 6 more exit-points popped up

- All core routers
- No EBGP



# A Path Before and After the Incident



BGP Next hop resolution: before 128.9.129.1/32 in ISIS vs. after 128.9.128.0/19 in BGP

Path	Source Node	Destination Node	Protocol	Resolved by Prefix
edge-dfw-03 → 199.221.80.0/24				
Hop 1	edge-dfw-03	core-dfw-01	BGP	199.221.80.0/24
Hop 2	core-dfw-01	core-aus-01	BGP	199.221.80.0/24
Hop 3	core-aus-01	edge-aus-01	BGP	199.221.80.0/24
Lookup 1			ISIS	128.9.129.1/32

Route  
Recursion

Path	Source Node	Destination Node	Protocol	Resolved by Prefix
edge-dfw-03 → 199.221.80.0/24				
Hop 1	edge-dfw-03	core-dfw-01	BGP	199.221.80.0/24
Hop 2	core-dfw-01	core-aus-01	BGP	199.221.80.0/24
Self Hop	core-aus-01	core-aus-01	BGP	199.221.80.0/24
Lookup 1			BGP	128.9.128.0/19

# Cause of Black Holing



- Every SP announces its address space externally in BGP
  - 128.9.128.0/19 BGP route is for this purpose
  - But it also resolves the NextHop address 128.9.129.1/32
- When the peering router crashed
  - IGP routes from that router were withdrawn in milliseconds
  - BGP routes from that router were not withdrawn
    - 3 KEEPALIVES of 60 seconds each – router rebooted before this
  - These BGP routes were now resolved by 128.9.128.0/19 in BGP
  - Injected by 6 core routers
  - Distance to a core router from any router is very low
  - Every router uses the dead router's BGP routes
- *We are good at designing networks when everything is up and running, but failure cases are often beyond our imagination*



- Insert a really expensive static route for the /19 to ISIS
  - It should cost more than longest possible path in IGP
  - ISIS routes preferred over BGP routes and will hide the /19 BGP route in recursion
  - Now, when a peering router crashes, the traffic will choose a true exit
  - See: <http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog34/presentations/gill.pdf>
  
- Do not: Make IBGP session converge faster (like running BFD)
  - One may argue the root cause is that BGP was too slow to withdraw
  - You will lose the IBGP session each time the IGP path of the session changes



# Challenges in Operating SDN



SDN makes networks programmable for

- Network overlays
- Bandwidth reservation
- Demand placement
- Service deployment
- Etc.

-- but --



What governs whether or not these programmatic changes should be made?  
What will be their impact?

## APPLICATIONS

Demand  
Placement

Service  
Deployment

Bandwidth  
Calendaring

ETC.

Northbound APIs

## SDN CONTROLLERS

Southbound APIs: OpenFlow, i2RS, PCE, NETCONF, ForCES, SNMP, CLI, etc.

PHYSICAL & VIRTUAL  
ROUTERS, SWITCHES &  
NETWORK FUNCTIONS



# Need for Analytics-Driven Applications



- When major apps/services are introduced, planning groups validate capacity
  - Quality of Experience expectations
  - Capacity planning
  - Changes to the topology, CoS treatment, ...
- If the apps/services are being rolled out without operator intervention, how do you plan for them?
  - SDN analytics addresses this concern

# How Rich Analytics Help a Bandwidth Scheduling Application




- Bandwidth scheduling: can I move  $\mathcal{X}$  bps from A to B at time  $t$  ?
- Attractiveness: SPs have abundance of spare bandwidth
  - Most SP networks have less than 50% utilization
    - Verizon: 46% average peak utilization
    - Level 3: 46-56% peak utilization range
- Can an SP profit from this spare capacity?
- But there are good reasons for this spare bandwidth

# A Naïve Implementation



- Let's collect link utilizations
  - This is near real time; and SPs already have it
- We need utilizations at time  $t$ 
  - Use historical link utilizations
  - Baseline: average same 5-minute or hour of the day for several weeks
  - Add projections for growth and safety
- Compute path from A to B and add  $\mathcal{X}$  bps to the links
  - Go or no-go decision based on new link utilizations
- If go, schedule the SDN controller to set up this path from A to B at time  $t$ , and tear it down afterwards

# Reasons for Spare Bandwidth



- Increased utilization  $\Rightarrow$  increased delay and jitter
  - Delay vs. link utilization curve has a sharp knee
- Network must accommodate failures
  - Network must have capacity to reroute the traffic around failures
  - Large networks have one link down at any given time, they must tolerate two link failures
- Traffic is growing but adding capacity takes time

# Addressing These Challenges





- Increased delay
  - Cap the go/no-go decision at ~65-70%
  - For anything above that we must be moving **bulk** traffic
    - Not suitable for uncompressed HD broadcast of an event
    - Not even suitable for best-effort traffic
    - Must deploy differentiated services
- Protect against failures via analytics driven simulation
  - Fail every (or two) link/router and see the impact on link utilizations
    - Not sufficient to fail just the links/routers along the path

# Failure Impact: Where will the traffic go?



- We need to know where the traffic is entering the network, how much traffic there is, and where it is exiting the network
  - Link utilizations don't tell where the traffic is entering or exiting the network
- We need to understand the network's routing to compute the new paths

# Need for a Traffic Demand Matrix




## □ Traffic Matrix:

- For each router pair (r1,r2), how much traffic entering at r1 is exiting at r2?

## □ Flow data coupled with routing gives us traffic matrix



# Simulation and Impact of a Failure



- For each flow on the failed link
  - Go to the ingress router and find the new path for the flow
  - Subtract flow's bandwidth from the old links
  - Add flow's bandwidth to the new links
  - Check to see if congestion crept in
- We need an accurate routing model of the network
  - Route analytics provides this for IGP, BGP, RSVP-TE, VPNs...

# Concluding Remarks



- Routing impacts network performance
  - Availability and reachability
  - Sub-optimal paths with longer delays, jitter
- Route analytics proves to be very effective in
  - Troubleshooting, monitoring, alerting
  - Reporting and network health assessment
  - Routing-aware traffic analysis
    - BGP peering analysis
    - Traffic matrices
- Rich analytics are key for successful SDN deployment and applications, including bandwidth scheduling